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 A ‘disappearance’1 begins when a person is detained by State agents, yet their whereabouts are 
concealed and their custody is denied by those same authorities. The secrecy and indefiniteness of 
duration make the cruelty of this phenomenon far beyond the scope of imagination.2 It is difficult to 
conceive what is more inhuman than letting someone simply vanish with no contact to the outside 
world, beyond the protection of the law. In addition, the ‘disappeared’ is under the total control of the 
authorities, vulnerable to torture. At the same time, due to the secrecy, this human rights violation is 
one of the most complex since direct evidence of what has happened to the ‘disappeared’ is unlikely to 
be obtained. However, in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Human Rights, the common standard of proof for finding a violation of the freedom from torture is that 
of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. Should, then, the evidentiary difficulties inherent to ‘disappearance’ 
cases impede such findings? 
The Inter-American Court has compensated for the special nature of ‘disappearance’ cases by adopting 
a specific approach to evidence. First, the Inter-American Court has developed a two-pronged approach 
that allows for the use of presumptions and circumstantial evidence on the basis of the existence of an 
official practice of ‘disappearances’.3 If the applicant can prove that the State engaged in an official 
practice that involves torture, and that there is sufficient evidence that the individual case is linked to 
this practice, then the burden of proof shifts and it is for the Government to disprove the allegations.4 If 
that Government fails to do so, the Court holds the State accountable for a violation of the right to 
humane treatment, as in cases against Honduras,5 Peru6 and Guatemala.7 Second, the Inter-American 
Court has incorporated the obligation to ‘ensure’ human rights in the right to humane treatment. 
Accordingly, it has stated, ‘subjecting a person to official, repressive bodies that practise torture and 
assassination with impunity is itself a breach of the duty to prevent violations of that right, even if that 
particular person is not tortured, or if those facts cannot be proven in a concrete case.’ 8 
By contrast, the starting point of the European Court seems to be, ‘where an apparent forced 
disappearance is characterised by total lack of information, whether the person is alive or dead or the 
treatment which she or he may have suffered can only be a matter of speculation.’9 Even though the 
Court has recognized that ‘independent, objective medical evidence or eyewitness testimony was 
unlikely to be forthcoming and that to require either as a prerequisite of a finding of a violation of 
Article 3 [freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment] would undermine the 
protection afforded by that provision’,10 the implications of this observation are not clear in practice. So 
far, the European Court has found a violation of freedom from torture or other ill-treatment only when 
the evidence showed ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, through several consistent eye-witness accounts, that 
such a violation occurred.11 In ‘disappearance’ cases against Turkey, applicants have argued a breach of 
Article 3 based on the existence of an official practice of ‘disappearances’ that includes torture.12 
Although the European Court has recognized similar conditions for the existence of an official practice 
as the Inter-American Court,13 it has rejected these claims based on insufficient evidence. Interestingly, 
besides a clear modus operandi and the testimony of a former member of the security force, the 
evidence of a practice in Turkey mirrors the evidence before the Inter-American Court concerning the 
countries where the latter has found such practice.14 Moreover, even though the European Court has 
found Turkey to be responsible for torture in detention centres,15 it has not adopted a similar approach 
to the Inter-American Court of finding a violation of torture in ‘disappearance’ cases based on the duty 
to prevent. 
The horrendous nature of ‘disappearances’ has gone unrecognised due to the inherent lack of evidence. 
The gravity of such acts demands that the regional Courts alter their approach to ‘disappearance’ cases 
accordingly. While the Inter-American Court has largely remedied the deficiency by adjusting the 
standard of proof and burden of proof, the European Court has practically failed to do so. However, 
there are tendencies in the Court’s jurisprudence of applying a less strict standard of proof with respect 
to certain violations. For example, the European Court has edged away from the standard of proof 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in cases of the right to life. It found a substantive violation of this right 
based on presumptions of death through circumstantial evidence.16  These developments are potentially 
an opening for a more lenient evaluation of evidence in torture claims as well. There are a number of 
cases pending at the European Court against the Russian Federation concerning ‘disappearances’ in 
Chechnya. These cases are likely to provide the European Court with the opportunity to acknowledge 
the evidentiary difficulties inherent to ‘disappearances’ and to recognize them as violations of the right 
to freedom from torture. 
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